We develop a theory that explains how two core values -Respect for others and Responsibility -affect productivity, the accumulation of capital, and output per worker. Using data from the World Values Survey, we empirically test the model using a panel dataset that includes 82 countries over six distinct years. We find that these two core values are important to production and that their impact is substantial. We also show that Respect and Responsibility reduce the influence of trust and mitigate the negative macroeconomic effects associated with fractionalized societies. Our results are robust to various treatments for endogeneity and under alternative samples.
Introduction
In an influential paper, Hall and Jones (1999) argue that the enormous variation in output per worker across countries is driven by differences in social infrastructure. They show that countries with stronger institutions achieve higher levels of investment in human and physical capital, greater productivity, and higher levels of output per worker. In this paper, we consider two cultural values -Respect for others and Responsibility -that we believe may be as fundamental to prosperity as other forms of social capital, or legal and political institutions.
We call these core values because we believe they reflect deeply-held beliefs that guide one's behavior and are fundamental elements of culture.
The literature linking cultural values to institutions and to economic development is growing. Tabellini (2010) finds that culture and institutions affect economic development. In his presidential address to the European Economic Association, Tabellini (2008a) called for more research on how individual values influence institutional outcomes. Guiso et al. (2006) summarize recent research relating culture to economic behavior and outcomes. They define culture as a set of unchangeable values and beliefs and identify religious faith and ethnicity as the key exogenous determinants of institutions and economic activity. More recently, Siegel et al. (2011) were able to explain international capital flows using a measure of distance in attitudes toward egalitarianism. And Balan and Knack (2012) showed that economic outcomes were systematically related to the within-country correlation between morality and ability. There is, moreover, a large literature on the effect of trust and social capital on living standards. 1
In this paper, we construct a theoretical model based on the idea that core values are deep determinants of productivity, physical and human capital accumulation, and output per worker. We think of Respect for others and Responsibility, like Trust, as components of social capital. Respect for others is a rough measure of how seriously people take the Golden Rule. This code of conduct, prominent in nearly all religions, encourages individuals to be trustworthy when dealing with others, regardless of social distance. Respect for others discourages shirking, cheating, and corruption in economic exchange. It raises the level of trust in society as in Breuer and McDermott (2012) , which facilitates exchange and increases scale. 2 Productivity, capital accumulation, and output per worker are enhanced.
Responsibility is also important. 3 We model individuals who place value on responsibility as having a low subjective discount rate. A low rate of time preference is the essence of responsibility. When individuals place a greater value on the future at the expense of the present, they are likely to invest in physical and human capital. Thus, we believe accumulation and productivity will be high in societies where responsibility is high. If this is true, output 1 Examples include the pioneering work of Mauro (1995) on corruption, Knack and Keefer (1997) on trust, and Acemoglu et al. (2001) on colonial development.
2 In our earlier paper, we claimed that the societal level of both trustworthiness and trust depended on the underlying distribution of caution in a society. We argued that more cautious individuals are more likely to be trustworthy because they desire to avoid punishment associated with acting opportunistically. But, more cautious individuals are also likely to be less trusting of others. This creates some tension in the model because trustworthiness is a basis for trust. That is, we demonstrate that more cautious societies may be less or more trusting. This is because the direct effect of caution on trust may be overcome by the indirect effect of caution on trustworthy behavior which effects the extent of trust.
3 President Obama made Responsibility a centerpiece of his speech given to school children on September 8, 2009 ; see http://www.whitehouse.gov/MediaResources/PreparedSchoolRemarks. per worker will also be high. We test our model using survey data on Respect for others and Responsibility from six waves of the World Values Survey (2009) across 82 countries. We follow a methodology similar to Hall and Jones (1999) where we investigate the impact of our two values on output per worker and its three component parts -productivity, capital intensity, and human capital.
We find consistent evidence that these two values matter. The pattern of results remains when we consider alternative specifications and samples.
Trust is considered an element of social capital and an important determinant of economic outcomes. So, we include it in our regressions alongside our two core values. Our results show a smaller role for Trust once Respect and Responsibility are included while Respect and Responsibility's impact remains.
It has also been argued that fractionalization retards economic development because societal divisions may bring civil conflict, corruption, mistrust, and oppression not experienced in more homogeneous societies (Mauro (1995) ). To test this idea, we include a measure of Ethnic Fractionalization in our regressions. We find that core values substantially reduce the negative impact of fractionalization on human capital accumulation, productivity, and output per worker -enough to offset its effects.
In the third part of the paper, we confront the issue of endogeneity. The core values we propose may be endogenous because we have omitted other relevant observables or unobservables that are correlated with the included variables, because of measurement error, or because of simultaneity with our outcome variables. We address these issues in several ways:
by expanding the set of regressors to include other qualities from the World Values Survey (2009), by investigating selection on observables, by using demographically-adjusted response rates to the survey questions on values; and with the standard treatment -instrumental variables estimation. Our instruments are measures of religious observance and institutional development. Regardless of the treatment we employ, we find the pattern established in the OLS results largely remains.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we construct a model of endogenous growth based on culture-determined scale and time preference. In Section 3 we describe our data and its sources. In Section 4 we estimate the basic model and report baseline results from OLS regressions where Respect and Responsibility are the main regressors. Here, we also investigate the influence of trust and ethnic fractionalization on output in the presence of core values. In Section 5, we address concerns about potential endogeneity and the robustness of our results using several approaches. Section 6 concludes.
A Theoretical Framework
In this section we outline a theoretical framework to explain why we think respect and responsibility are important for economic development. The full model is available as an online appendix.
Respect, Responsibility, and Growth
In his book The Moral Foundation of Economic Behavior, Rose (2011) argues that prosperity depends on having a trustworthy society. Trustworthiness discourages opportunism and creates the basis for trust, which encourages scale in production and exchange. He explains that trustworthy behavior is necessary to overcome the commons dilemma and what he calls "the empathy problem" -both of which increase as an economy grows and impersonal, faceless exchange becomes more prevalent. At the same time, honest behavior deters "golden opportunities to cheat" that arise more frequently in production as specialization and localized knowledge are required for producing efficiently.
What is the source of trustworthiness? Our view is that it arises, at least in part, from historical and persistent cultural traits. We refer to this dimension of culture as respect for others. Where children are taught to be honest, even with those who are different from themselves, trust flourishes. In his work on regional growth in Europe, Tabellini (2010) identifies social capital with both trust and respect. He considers this kind of social capital a key cultural characteristic.
Using a model of labor teams cooperating with capital, it can be shown that aggregate productivity depends on scale generated by respect. Consider the standard production function for Country j:
where K is physical capital, H ≡ hL is aggregate human capital (L is labor and h is individual human capital ) and A is factor productivity. As usual, the parameter α < 1. The key feature of our model is that A depends on respect through scale.
The model is presented in detail in the online appendix, but the key idea is that there is a limit to the number of people that any firm can employ. The strict limit on employee size reflects the idea that in some societies reliable workers can be drawn from a very small pool, a circle of trusted family members, perhaps, or friends who are bound to employers by years of service or past favors. In other societies, where there is a culture of respect for others -so that employers have a reasonable expectation that golden opportunities in Rose's sense will not be taken by their employees -it is possible to have a much larger workforce in any firm.
Given a firm production function that rewards labor variety, national output will rise if firms can be larger. Respect allows greater firm size, which will show up in the national statistics as greater productivity and greater output per capita.
In The Moral Sense, Wilson (1993) identifies four key cultural traits that shape society.
One of them, self-control, is very close to what we have in mind with responsibility: the ability to resist immediate gratification for a great future reward. Adam Smith called this virtue self-command and considered it the virtue of most use to the individual (Smith, 1794; Part 4, IV, 17) . More recently, Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) use the concept of patience in the same cultural sense.
People who are Responsible are willing to spend time and effort today to earn a future reward or avoid a future cost. Irresponsible people do not sustain effort with the future in mind. They are impatient and often neglect making investments that will make them better off. Children are taught to be responsible by delaying consumption in order to increase it later. They are taught to be punctual, do their work, pay their bills on time, live within their means, and not break the law. It is difficult to conceive of any definition of responsibility that does not involve thinking about the future. This logic establishes the presumption that societies endowed with a cultural bias to be responsible also have a low rate of time preference, ρ, and that human and physical capital will therefore be higher.
In the online appendix, we integrate these ideas about Respect and Responsibility into a model of endogenous growth and derive empirical implications of culture on development.
There, we show that growth in the steady state is given by:
where γ j is the growth rate of both h and y in Country j. In this equation, the net return to both human and physical capital is BA 1−α − δ, where δ is the common rate of depreciation and B ≡ α α (1 − α) 1−α is a constant. Productivity A is now written as an explicit, positive function of R c,j , which stands for the cultural value Respect in Country j. Respect raises the growth rates of h and y by raising the return to capital of both types. Time preference ρ is expressed as an explicit, inverse function of R n,j , which stands for the value Responsibility in Country j. Responsibility raises the growth rate by reducing the rate of time preference. For simplicity, we do not allow R n to influence firm productivity A directly, but it seems plausible that a great number of responsible individuals might have an independent, positive effect on A.
Empirical Implications
Respect and Responsibility work by increasing saving and investment, which have permanent effects on the growth rates of y and h. If we observe output per worker y j = Y j L j across countries at a single date, we expect to find that the wealthiest countries are those with the greatest respect for others and the most responsibility. These two core values will have endowed them with high A and low ρ, both of which put these nations on high growth paths and place them in the upper portion of the income distribution. In a regression, we would expect y j to be positively and robustly correlated with both R c,j and R n,j .
Our model also has implications for the components of y. We decompose per-worker output in the same way as Mankiw et al. (1992) , Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999) . From (1) this yields:
where
Human capital per worker h, like per worker output y, grows at the rate γ given in equation (2). It follows that h should be positively related to both respect and responsibility:
the greater is A and the smaller is ρ, the higher the level of h observed in a cross-section of countries.
Productivity A and capital intensity κ, on the other hand, are constant over time. Their levels, not their rates of growth, depend on core values.
Capital intensity is constant because K and Y grow at the same rate. In balanced growth, κ does not depend on responsibility and is an inverse function of respect. Countries with high levels of R c should in fact have low values of κ. Capital intensity, as we show in the online appendix, can be written as 5 :
where β ≡ 1−α α . The inverse relationship between respect R c and capital intensity κ is a testable implication of our theory.
In balanced growth, we can eliminate capital intensity in (1) using (4) and show that per capita output is:
Respect -through A and h -and responsibility -through h -have a positive effect on per 4 Technically, capital intensity is the simple ratio K Y
. We use the term to refer to the ratio to the power of
since it only appears in this form. 5 It is possible to write κ this way because K is proportional to H in balanced growth. We focus on a set of questions (numbered a027 -a042) that were routinely asked in the survey. We call this set of questions the "Qualities Group." In the Qualities Group, the following question was asked several times sequentially:
"Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you feel to be especially important? Please choose up to five (CODE
FIVE ONLY)."
Each time it was asked, the question was accompanied by a list of qualities in order as 7 :
independence, hard work, feeling of responsibility , imagination, tolerance and respect for others, thrift saving money and things, determination and perseverance, religious faith, unselfishness, and obedience. 6 The first five waves of the two surveys were integrated into a single database in 2009. The last wave, Wave 6, was carried out by the European Values Survey between 2008 and 2010. We integrated this wave into the other five waves for the analysis.
7 There were more qualities asked than in our list below -like good manners, politeness, honesty, leadership, self-control, and loyalty. However, good manners was not asked in all of the countries comprising a wave and the latter five qualities were only asked in Wave 1.
We use responses to tolerance and respect for others (Respect, for short) and feeling of responsibility (Responsibility, for short) and calculate the percentage of respondents selecting the value as important for each country in each wave. The number of respondents per wave varies across countries but typically ranges from 1,000-1,300. These percentages (or response rates) are our measures of the two core values, Respect and Responsibility.
In constructing the response rates, we dropped the data for all interviewees who did not select exactly five qualities as being important. This is the only way to guarantee crosscountry and cross-wave comparability in the empirical work. We began with a total of 419,479 individual observations. Of these, 386,731 selected five or fewer qualities. And of these, 310,595 selected exactly five of the possible qualities. This is the sample we use to aggregate into mean response rates per quality for each country-wave. 
Decomposing Output per Worker
We decompose output per worker in each country into each of its components in (3). Our data for y comes from the Penn World Table (Heston et al. (2006) ) -we use the RGDP W 2 series, which is real output per worker based on the Laspeyres method. Data for human and physical capital has not been standardized in the same way, so we construct measures for both following the methodology of Hall and Jones (1999) .
To construct individual human capital h, Hall and Jones (1999) assume that the logarithm of h is related to years of schooling in a piece-wise linear manner. For 1 to 4 years, the return to schooling is 13.4 percent; for the next four, 10.1 percent; after that, it is 6.8 percent. These are average rates of return for, respectively, Sub-Saharan Africa, the world, and the OECD, as measured by Psacharopoulos (1994) . The data for years of schooling comes from Barro and Lee (2011): we use the measure of the years of schooling of the typical person over the age of 25.
We construct a capital series K using the perpetual inventory method. There are two steps. First, we estimated the initial capital stock: K 0 = Ia γ+δ . In this expression, I a is the average of the first four observations of investment in each country, γ is the growth rate, and δ is the rate of depreciation. We assume γ = .02 and δ = .06 in all countries. Second, we applied the recursive formula K t+1 = (1 − δ) K t + I t to fill out later values of K. We use the earliest observation possible, which is 1960 in most cases. To get capital intensity κ, we divide our capital series by the series RGDP L from the Penn World Table (this is real GDP per person) multiplied by the population, and then raised to the power of α 1−α . We use α = .333. Our parameter values for δ and α are those assumed by Hall and Jones (1999) . We tried different values for the parameters γ and δ, but it made little difference for our results. 8 We did not, however, attempt to estimate country-specific growth rates or depreciation rates or values for α. Work by Gollin (2002) suggests that the return to labor 1 − α does not differ dramatically across countries, even between those at different levels of development. Depreciation rates may differ, however, and this could have a important effect on our estimates of κ. The construction of reliable estimates of capital across countries is an area of ongoing research in empirical macroeconomics. 9 Productivity A is found as the residual once the other series in (3) have been constructed.
The sources and descriptions of the variables are provided in Appendix A. In Table 2 , we report correlations between the variables. We see that Respect for others and Responsibility are positively correlated with our components of production in nearly all cases. The only exception is the correlation between κ and Respect.
OLS Estimation

Basic Empirical Model
Our empirical model is motivated by the theory from Section 2 where hypotheses were generated about the effects of Respect and Responsibility on A, κ, h, and y. Our baseline specification is:
Here, Q j,k represents an element of the set of the outcome variables:
in logs for country j in wave k. X j represents a control variable. Our parameters of interest are α 1 and α 2 , which capture, respectively, the effect of Respect and Responsibility on Q.
Finally, j,k is the error term. For now, we assume R c,j and R n,j are exogenous so that j,k is uncorrelated with each -a point we will take up in Section 5.
The control variable for all specifications is Latitude. (See Appendix A for the definition.)
One reason to use a control is that our model may not capture all plausible channels through which Q j,k is affected. Latitude is likely to have an important direct effect on outcomes. This is not only because of institutions, but also because geography and climate in the North may be more suited to production. Another good reason for the inclusion of Latitude is to lessen any bias from the existence of omitted variables. It is possible that Latitude may be correlated with R c and R n because of past history: the culture, institutions, and education levels of people living in, and migrating to, Northern latitudes may be conducive to the formation of the values we have identified.
We estimate (6) using pooled OLS. We do this for a few reasons. First, the panel data is highly unbalanced. Some countries have data for several waves, others for only one. Moreover, some waves were heavily weighted toward certain groups of countries. Wave 6, for example, is almost exclusively OECD countries. Second, the use of Latitude as a control means that
we cannot estimate our model with any country fixed effects. However, to an extent because Latitude does not vary over time, it captures country-specific effects. Finally, and maybe more important, to the extent that R c and R n do not change over time, there will be very little variation in these explanatory variables. This would make it hard to estimate their effects with precision if we attempted fixed effects estimation.
Baseline Results
Our first set of results, estimating (6) with pooled OLS, is reported in Table 3 . Panels A, B, C, and D, correspond to the outcome variables in Q. In the first two columns of each panel, we include R c and R n separately. In the third column, we include both. Column 4 of each panel includes Latitude as a control. We also run all specifications including six regional dummies or an OECD dummy. The pattern of results is very similar, but for brevity, we do not report them. Table 3 reveals a pattern that we will see repeated throughout the paper: Respect and
Responsibility are generally both positive and significant for productivity A, human capital h, and output per worker y. For capital intensity κ, Respect is negative and significant while
Responsibility is positive and significant.
Panel A reports the results for productivity. When Respect or Responsibility is included alone, each is statistically significant, positive across all specifications, and accounts for about 10 percent of the country-wave variation in productivity. This rises to 26 percent when both are included with Latitude. We find that a 1 percentage point increase in R c or R n corresponds to a rise in productivity between 0.9-1.5 percentage points.
Panel B reports the results for these same specifications for capital intensity. With or without the control, we see that Respect is negative and significant and that Responsibility is positive and significant. The coefficients and adjusted R 2 values are very small, however.
Our theoretical model predicts the negative effect of R c on κ, but it does not predict that R n will be significant for either A or κ. As we shall see, however, both of these results are quite robust, leading us to conclude that there must be another channel through which R n works. of these values will collectively increase output per worker by 3.5 percent. The inclusion of
Latitude dampens the effect, but it still remains large at 2.4 percent.
Overall, we find support that our two core values are statistically significant determinants of productivity, physical and human capital accumulation, and output per worker in a way consistent with our theory. In nearly all cases, we see levels of statistical significance of 4% or higher. 
Core Values and Trust
There has been much empirical work that examines the influence of trust on economic outcomes and finds a statistically significant, positive relationship (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; and Guiso et al., 2009) . In this section, we include the well-known trust question from the World Values Survey (2006) in (6), to see if it adds anything to the determination of y or its components. In Breuer and McDermott (2012) , we constructed a theoretical model to explain how trust arises endogenously. One of the key building blocks of that model was the causal relationship running from trustworthiness to trust. We think of Respect for others as conceptually similar to trustworthiness. Therefore, we expect that the inclusion of
Respect will reduce or eliminate the effect of trust on the outcome variables in Q. Another reason to include Trust is that there is good reason to think that it is an omitted variable that is correlated with our core values. If so, its inclusion is warranted to lessen any endogeneity that might arise from this source.
The trust question reads:
"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? 1. Most people can be trusted.
and 2. Can't be too careful."
The percentage of respondents in each country selecting "Most people can be trusted" corresponds to our measure of Trust. (See Appendix A for details). Table 4 reports the results where we now include Trust and our two core values, with and without Latitude. As a starting point, we present results where only Trust is a regressor. The first column of each panel of Table 4 documents that trust is significant to A, h, and y, but not for κ.
However, our results show that the impact of trust declines in magnitude (whether statistically significant or not) with the inclusion of our two core values and even further with
Latitude. We also see that the effect of Trust seems to work only through productivity A (and therefore to y also), as suggested by our theoretical model. The coefficients of Trust on κ are not significant in any specification and for h are near zero and insignificant in Column (4).
Those for A and y, on the other hand, remain significant regardless of the specification.
Core Values and Societal Divisions
It is unsurprising that in countries with recurring ethnic and religious tensions, we see lower standards of living and lower levels of education, investment, and productivity. Empirical work by Mauro (1995) , Easterly and Levine (1997) , Alesina and Ferrara (2005) , and Montalvo and To test our idea, we investigate the effect of Ethnic Fractionalization on Q using data from Alesina et al. (2003) . (See Appendix A). We first regress our outcome variables on Ethnic Fractionalization alone. These results are reported in the first column of each of the panels in Table 5 . Ethnic fractionalization has a statistically significant negative effect on A, h, and y and explains up to 14 percent of the variation in each. Ethnic fractionalization, however, does not appear to affect κ in any case. Table 5 is largely repeated, but there is one important difference. Either type of polarization exerts a strong negative influence: it eliminates the significance of Respect for A and y when Latitude is also included.
One explanation is that in highly polarized societies, Respect may be strong within factions, but not across them. 10 There is an alternative view. Fractionalized societies are more diverse and therefore more likely to bring variety, imagination, and better problem solving to the production process. It is possible, therefore, that fractionalized societies could achieve better economic growth rates. See Alesina et al. (2000) and Lazear (1999) .
11 Polarization is a measure of societal division that reaches a maximum when there are two groups. Fractionalization rises with the number of groups. See Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) . 
Endogeneity and Robustness
OLS and Endogeneity Problems
We have assumed to this point that our core values R c and R n are exogenous. In this section, we consider the alternative. If Cov (R i , ) = 0 for i = (c, n) in (6) then core values are endogenous and our OLS estimates of α 1 and α 2 reported in Table 3 are biased. There are three common sources of endogeneity: omitted variables, measurement error, and simultaneity.
We address these potential problems in turn.
Omitted Variables Bias and Other Variables from the WVS
There may be other variables that are important in the determination of Q that we have omitted from (6) . These omitted variables will be present in . Candidate omitted variables may include any of the other allied qualities asked in the Qualities Group. If any of these allied qualities are correlated with R c or R n we introduce potential bias into our estimates α 1 and α 2 . This bias can be reduced by including the omitted additional qualities in (6) . 12 There is little guidance as to what specifications would be appropriate to consider. Have we omitted one, two, or more additional qualities? We choose to estimate (6) by adding, one by one, each of the other eight values from the Qualities Group described in Section 3.1. 13 Our results are shown in Table 6 . The first column shows the coefficient and p-value for the newly added value (e.g. Independence in Row 1); the second column shows the same information for Respect; and the third column for Responsibility. We do not report the coefficients or p-values for our control variable, Latitude, or the constant, but both were always included and were positive and significant.
Our two core values retain the pattern observed earlier. Responsibility is positive and significant in every variant of the specification in the panels for A, κ, h, and y, even in instances where the added quality is itself significant. Respect is positive and significant in every specification for h and negative and significant in all but one case for κ, repeating the pattern of results established earlier. Its effect on A and y, however, are not as uniform.
Note that of the eight included additional qualities in the regression for A, five of the coefficients are significant, but four of them are negative. In the regression for y, five of the six significant coefficients are negative. In both cases, the lone exception is unselfishness. It is significant, positive, and drives out the explanatory power of our core value R c . In itself, 12 The results reported in Table 4 and Table 5 , where we included trust and ethnic fractionalization, can be viewed as ways to lessen omitted variable bias. 13 With eight additional values to consider, the number of possible regressions that could be run using pairwise combinations of the additional qualities rises to 28 for each of the outcome variables [A, k h y]. We run these regressions, but for brevity do not report the results. The results for Rc and Rn were little changed. The negative coefficients on the Added values suggest that there may be something fundamentally different -and important -about our two core values. We would like to believe it is because our core values are permanent and exogenous, whereas the other values -Hard Work, for example -are endogenous. That is, societies that have high productivity and high incomes per capita may generate a shift in attitude away from hard work, persistence, and obedience, and more to leisure, entertainment, and independence. If true, this could explain the negative coefficients in some of the cells. In fact, this is one message of Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) , who construct a theoretical model in which a preference for hard work, in particular, declines as society develops. Inglehart and Baker (2000) hypothesize that some values are influenced by social and economic development, whereas others have a more permanent componentand do not easily change. Therefore, it does not seem unreasonable to interpret negative coefficients as evidence that reverse causation is at work. A positive coefficient, however, is not proof that the trait in question is exogenous.
Selection on Observables
It is possible that even after controlling for observable omitted variables, bias in our estimates of α 1 and α 2 from (6) may persist because of important omitted unobservables. This is because the additional observable variables -call the set V -may not completely capture an additional important but intangible cultural quality C that influences Q and that may be correlated with core values. If true, our estimating equation (6) should be replaced with:
Assume that Culture C is determined by observable variables V and an unobservable variable c. Thus,
If Cov(R c , c) = 0 or Cov (R n , c) = 0 then our estimates of Respect and Responsibility in Table 6 will be biased, even though we have controlled for V. It is possible that the bias from unobservables is so large that the effect of R c and R n on Q is really zero, and our positive and significant estimates of α 1 and α 2 are just an illusion. We would like to know how large the selection on observables would have to be, relative to selection on unobservables, for this to be the case.
To find the relevant ratio, we follow Bellows and Miguel (2009) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) . This method stems from original work by Altonji et al. (2005) in a set-up where the variable of interest is binary. The first step in the method is to estimate α i using different models, one using a restricted set of controls (possibly no controls) and one -the full model -that introduces additional controls (or observables) the inclusion of which may attenuate potential bias stemming from unobservables. The more observables we include, the less likely bias from unobservables is at fault. In our case, the restricted model corresponds to our original estimating equation (6) . Theseα i estimates are reported in Table 3 using (6) . We then estimate two variants of a full model, V 1 and V 2 . V 1 adds Trust and Ethnic Fractionalization to (6) . V 2 augments the first variant with the first principal component of the eight additional qualities from the Qualities Group. The estimates from these variants are labelledα i,V j .
From these regressions, we calculate the ratio for each outcome in Q:
Under the assumption that the true effect α i = 0, we know that
so we can use it to consider the plausibility that our results are driven by unobservables in (6) . 14 If we form T 1,1 using the coefficient estimate on Respectα 1 from (6) for productivity A and the coefficient estimateα 1,V 1 from the same regression supplemented with Trust and Ethnic Fractionalization, we get a value of 13.30 (see the first cell of Table 7 ). We interpret this to mean that the influence of unobservables on Respect must be 13.3 times greater than the influence of observables if α 1 were really zero. Altonji et al. (2005) , Bellows and Miguel (2009), and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) state that the larger the ratio in absolute value, the less plausible it is that results can be explained by omitted unobservables. In these papers, ratios in excess of 1 were interpreted to mean that bias from unobservables was unlikely.
In Table 7 we present the T i,j ratio in sixteen cases. There are two panels in Table 7 : the top panel refers to R c and the bottom panel to R n . In each panel, the row labeled V 1 reports the T ratios in (9) usingα i,V 1 from our first model variant; the row labeled V 2 reports the T ratios from our second model variant. In all cases the T ratios for Respect and Responsibility are above 2 -and in most cases they are well above 3. Bias owing to unobservables does not appear to be a problem. 
Demographic Adjustment
Another source of bias may arise because of measurement error. Typically, measurement error is explored in the context of one explanatory variable. Our problem of measurement error is compounded by the fact that our two key explanatory variables are likely to contain, at least, a similar source of mismeasurement. That is, R c,j = R * c,j + ω, and R n,j = R * n,j + ω, where R * c,j and R * n,j are the "deep" measures of core values in country j uninfluenced by, e.g. demographic characteristics. We assume the error term, ω, may contain both random (ε) and non-random (χ) sources of mismeasurement. In the classic errors in variables case, the mismeasurement is unobservable and random. Here, however we expect that observable demographic traits may systematically influence survey responses at the individual level and thus our measured response rates, aggregated at the country-wave level.
Ideally, we would like to get a measure of R * c,j and R * n,j, . To do this, we can control for demographic influences on the survey responses S. We begin by using the survey data gathered at the individual level in each country for each wave. This micro-level data includes each individual's response to the survey questions in the Qualities Group discussed in Section 3.1. We use only those survey respondents who selected exactly five qualities, as before. We also have data on various demographic characteristics of each individual. To capture χ, we choose to use the following demographic characteristics since these seem most relevant: Age, Gender, and Education. (See Appendix A). There are approximately 250,000 individuals responses across Waves 2 -6. Wave 1 was dropped from the analysis since no data on education was collected in that survey.
We estimate the following regression, using the individual-level data:
where S i,j,k is individual i s binary response in country j in wave k. The variable Wave is a dummy variable for each wave, where Wave 2 is the omitted category. We include wave dummies in the estimation to preserve the panel nature of our response rate data. Country is a dummy variable for each country with the United States as the omitted group. We estimate (10) for our two main qualities of interest -Respect and Responsibility.
Using the individual responses to the Respect question for S i,j,k , our new, conditional aggregate measure of R * c in Wave k for Country j equals (β 0 + θ k + ϕ j ). For the US in Wave 2, however, it is just β 0 , since Wave 2 and the US were the omitted cases for the two dummies.
Our conditional measure of R * n is constructed in the same way. These estimates provide a demographically-adjusted measure of Respect and Responsibility aggregated at the country and wave-level. Tabellini (2010) uses a similar treatment in demographically adjusting values from the European Values Survey across region and country. In total, we have 188 observations -fewer than the 239 from our earlier work. This is because there were some countries in Wave 2 where data on Education was not collected. The correlation between the demographically-adjusted series and the unadjusted response rates is 0.92 for Respect and 0.93 for Responsibility.
Earlier, we had stated that we believe that the core values we identify are deeply-held beliefs. Though they are a facet of culture, we view them as an enduring component. If true,
Respect and Responsibility will not change over time. An examination of the estimates of the θ j 's -the coefficients on the wave dummies -provides some favorable evidence. First, the coefficients are small. The average across θ 3 − θ 6 for Respect is −0.03 and for Responsibility is 0.012. The respective means are 0.62 and 0.74. Second, there is no discernible trend in the coefficients -they are neither trending up nor down over time. This result supports recent evidence documented by Guiso et al. (2008) and Tabellini (2008a Tabellini ( , 2010 that cultural values are persistent, at least globally.
With these alternative measures of Respect and Responsibility, we re-estimate specifications used in Tables 3 -7. To conserve on space, we report results from estimating (6) and supplementing it with Trust, Ethnic Fractionalization, or one additional quality as in Table   6 . 15 The three columns in each panel of Tables 8 and 9 show the coefficient estimates for the 15 We followed the same two procedures for creating alternative measures of Trust and for each of the additional qualities listed in Table 6 . We lose two countries with the Trust data. Robust p-values in brackets.** significant at 1%; * at 5%; † at 10%. added variable and for Respect (R c ) and Responsibility (R n ) from (6) . In all cases, our control Latitude and a constant were included, but are not reported.
We find even stronger support for the importance of our two core values. Respect and Responsibility are now highly significant in nearly all cases for A and y -the one exception is when we add the hard work quality, but that has a negative influence. These results are reported in Table 8, panel A and Table 9 , panel D. By comparison, with the unadjusted data, there were a total of seven exceptions out of 16 -four for A and three for y. For κ in Table   8 panel B, Responsibility retains its significance always and Respect is always negative -as the theory predicts -and significant in seven of the eleven cases. For human capital h in Table 9 panel C, Responsibility is highly significant across specifications, and Respect retains significance in many cases. We also see that Trust generally loses its significance when our 
Simultaneous Equations Bias and Instrumental Variables Estimation
Cultural traits appear to be persistent, 16 but this does not mean that they are not influenced by living standards. As incomes rise, it is likely that values change, if only slowly. Simultaneity of this kind means that our previous estimates of the effect of Respect and Responsibility are biased. Here, we focus exclusively on the single outcome, per worker income y, since it makes most sense to link the determination of values to income and not, say, to capital intensity or productivity.
We can address simultaneous equations bias in (6) -as well as other sources of biasby using instrumental variables estimation (or two-stage least squares 2SLS). Ideally, we would like to have deep historical measures of Respect and Responsibility to be instruments for current values, but cultural data from the distant past is sparse. To overcome the lack of historical data on values, we need observable variables that are correlated with R c and R n but have little independent effect on our outcome variable y.
There is a rich tradition of using instruments in the literature on economic growth, 17 but there have been fewer papers that address the specific problem of evolving culture over time. In his important work, Tabellini (2010) uses historical European data on literacy and political restraint as instruments for his cultural measures. Much of the research in this area, however, has used some measure of religion as an instrument for values. Barro and McCleary (2003) and McCleary and Barro (2006) use three measures of the state's involvement in society's religious life and the extent of religious pluralism as instruments for beliefs and church attendance. Guiso et al. (2006) use the individual's religion and country of ancestor's origin as instruments for responses to the trust question. To explain government performance in US states, Knack (2002) uses religious composition variables as instruments for social capital. Zak and Knack (2001) employ a similar strategy in their work on cross-country growth. In their analysis of international investment, Siegel et al. (2011) show that differences in the moral quality egalitarianism, instrumented by past religion, war history, and social fractionalization, account for a significant amount of financial flows across borders. The interaction of morality and human capital may be more important than either separately in determining economic 16 Fernandez (2010 ), Fernandez and Fogli (2009 ), and Tabellini (2010 show that the country of origin of one's grandparents is very influential in determining a person's values today. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) use genetic distance as a metric for the extent to which cultural or biological beliefs, customs, etc. are transmitted intergenerationally. Theoretical work by Bisin and Verdier (2001) and Tabellini (2008b) shows that culture is shaped over time by persistent forces originating in the family structure. 17 To mention a few: Hall and Jones (1999) , Acemoglu et al. (2001) ; Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) , Glaeser et al. (2004), and Sachs (2000) .
outcomes. To make this case, Balan and Knack (2012) instrument for the morality-ability correlation with religious affiliation measures and the state antiquity index (see Bockstette et al. (2002) ).
Our identification strategy is similar to that of Siegel et al. (2011) and Balan and Knack (2012) Values are also likely to be shaped by secular institutions over time. The longer states have been in existence, the more likely they are to have developed a national identity, a common language, and a stable bureaucracy. The longer a nation has been in existence, we hypothesize, the stronger any cultural attribute. Accordingly, we think the State Antiquity Index (or SAI ) from Bockstette et al. (2002) is another potential instrument. This variable is a weighted measure of years of organized statehood going back to 1A.D. It seems plausible that the main channel through which SAI would affect economic outcomes is value formation.
Our last instrument is a measure of institutional quality in each country. We use the index of civil liberties in 1972 -the first year it was available -which we call CL72. The idea here is that institutions that protect civil liberties embody a society's values. If values are persistent, institutions in 1972 will be reliable measures of historical values. Moreover, past institutions will influence y mainly through cultural values.
Since our main OLS estimating equation (6) contains two potentially endogenous regressors, R c and R n , for which we must instrument, we will examine the pairwise desirability of our four instruments -CP80, Muslim80, SAI, and CL72 (Latitude is an included exogenous regressor, and is always in the instrument set).
It should be recognized that IV estimation has its own problems. The choice between OLS -in the presence of endogeneity -and IV is one that involves trading one set of biases for another. The difficulties in isolating these biases in the case of IV rise, moreover, as the number of endogenous regressors increases. This is because the ability to identify valid, exogenous instruments that contribute independently to the identification of each endogenous regressor becomes more difficult. If good instruments are not found, problems associated with 2SLS are exacerbated.
For that reason, in this section we first estimate (6) by 2SLS with only one endogenous regressor, R c or R n . The results are reported in the first two columns of Table 10 . Our choice of desirable instrument sets was selected where the F-test for the joint significance of the instruments is greater than 10 -the rule-of-thumb critical value. The first-stage F tests reported in Table 10 show that the instruments are strong. In addition, the test for overidentification shows that using more than one instrument helps to identify the effect of R c (R n ) on y. That is, we "accept" the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. Turning to the coefficient estimates on R c and R n reported in Columns 1 and 2, we see that the earlier OLS results are confirmed. The coefficient estimates are positive, large, and highly significant.
Next, we use the principal component of the two values (pcR) in place of either value alone. This allows us to keep the information in both values, but also to keep the number of endogenous regressors to one. Tabellini (2010) follows a similar strategy. These results are reported in Column 3 of Table 10 . In Column 4, we include both values together acknowledging that the complexity of statistical and interpretive issues rises in this case. In these latter two regressions, we use all four instruments.
When we use pcR, the F-test on the first-stage regression exceeds 10 and so we conclude that the instrument set is relevant. Also, the test for overidentification suggests our instrument set is valid. When we include both endogenous regressors, we report Shea (1997)'s partial R 2 and the Stock-Yogo test for weak identification in Column 4. (We also report the first-stage F-tests even though the critical value of 10 does not necessarily mean that the instruments are jointly relevant). These latter two diagnostics help determine whether the instrumental variables capture enough independent variation in the two endogenous regressors to allow for identification. Shea's partial R 2 is reasonable and the Stock-Yogo test confirms that we can reject the null hypothesis that the instrument set is weak. That is, that the bias from weak instruments that may be introduced when we use 2SLS is no more than 10% of the inconsistency from the endogenous regressors in OLS. (See Stock et al. (2002) ). The overidentification test is also passed. The results are again very supportive of the theoretical model and accord with the OLS results: the coefficients on R c and R n are positive and significant.
We also estimated all of the specifications using LIM L, which is considered to be superior in the presence of possibly weak instruments. We found virtually no difference in the results. As a final test, we replaced the instrument CL72 with the settler mortality variable in Acemoglu et al. (2001) . The results are also very good, but the sample size is much smaller. 
Conclusion
This paper continues recent work on the search for deep determinants of economic development. We take seriously the idea that culture contains an exogenous component, and that this component is a significant determinant of economic outcomes. Our first step was to construct a model of growth in which two core values -Respect for others and Responsibility -are key determinants of output. Respect for others raises trust, scale, and productivity; and Responsibility encourages patience and investment. The structure also allows us to decompose output per worker into the product of human capital, physical capital intensity, and productivity, and to see how they are related to our two core values.
The empirical analysis was carried out in two parts. In the first part, we ran pooled OLS on various specifications using data from 82 countries and six waves of data from the World Values Survey. Our explanatory variables were response rates on two questions that we believe measure the intensity with which the two core values are held. We showed that these response rates are almost always significant and of sizable magnitude in explaining output per worker and its components, even with the inclusion of Latitude as a control.
We introduced two other cultural variables -Trust and Ethnic Fractionalization -(one at a time) into the analysis. Both of these have been shown to be highly correlated with economic performance. We find the same here, but they have a considerably smaller impact when we include Respect and Responsibility with them in the regressions. The results support the idea that trust is, at least partly, determined by Respect -a building block of the theoretical model -and that values can mitigate, or even offset, the detrimental effects of ethnic or other divisions.
In the second part of the empirical analysis, we addressed concerns about endogeneity.
First, into the basic regression with core values and Latitude, we introduced the other qualities -one at a time -from the list that survey respondents were given. We did this primarily to see if there was anything different about our core values Respect and Responsibility. In fact, we found, with one exception (Unselfishness) that none of the other values was positive and significant for output per worker or its components. This does not prove exogeneity, but it suggests that the values identified by our theoretical model are important in ways that other virtues are not.
Second, because we cannot observe all potentially omitted variables, we investigated the potential for bias arising from unobservables using the method of Altonji et al. (2005) . We concluded that it was implausible that there was significant bias arising from unobservable variables that were correlated with our values variables.
Response rates averaged over all respondents may reflect the demographic composition of different societies. To address this, we used the micro-level source data to construct aggregated conditional response rates that controlled for age, sex, and education. These demographicallyadjusted measures of Respect and Responsibility are more likely to capture deeply-held values.
Using these response rates, we obtain even stronger results.
Finally, we allowed for simultaneity between core values and output per worker. We then estimated our main equation using instrumental variables estimation. Our instruments were measures of religion and institutions which reflect deep-seated values that may not be otherwise correlated with economic outcomes. Our main conclusions were not altered. Respect and Responsibility are important to production.
Our findings have several important implications. First, they suggest an alternative interpretation to studies that find political and legal institutions are critical to output per worker and economic development. It is conceivable that these institutions may matter because fundamentally, they capture the core values a society holds dear. Our work also offers an explanation for the inertia of institutions and underdevelopment. Because core values are likely to be highly persistent, they may be able to explain the persistence of institutions and underdevelopment.
The persistence of underdevelopment has long been recognized yet is not well-understood.
If core values are the key to economic success, then persistence may reflect the difficulty in changing the fundamental principles by which citizens behave and interact.
A Data Appendix
We used the following data in the paper. 4. k. Physical capital intensity K Y . Source: K is constructed using the perpetual inventory method using data from investment from the Penn World Table v. 7.0.
5. h. Human capital per capita. Source: Constructed using the method of Hall and Jones, 1999 using the data from Barro and Lee, 2001. 
